There exists a large literature which shows that public education is favorable for growth because it increases the level of human capital and at the same time it tends to produce a more even income distribution. More egalitarian societies are also associated with less social conflicts, and individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality is high. Therefore, it is important to study the reasons why the elite opposes the development of a strong public education system. It might be that education is related to social status and a strong public education system might threaten the elite's political power. We show that one aspect of social status is the specialization of skilled workers in high-paid jobs and the abundance of unskilled workers in the production of cheap "home goods" in the market, such as painting and cleaning a house, babysitting, and/or cooking. We emphasize the role of general We owe many thanks to Stephen L. Parente for helpful discussion, and Anne P. Villamil, an anonymous referee, and an associate editor for valuable comments. We are also indebted to Alexandre Rands de Barros, Márcio Corrêa, and Paulo Amilton Leite Filho for suggestions in an earlier
equilibrium price adjustments to show that depending on the level of inequality, the elite might prefer an economy with a positive and "high" cost of education than an economy where skills are freely provided. We show that this result goes through even if the skilled wage is not directly affected by the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. We also provide empirical evidence consistent with our theory.
Keywords Persistent inequality · Home goods · Education · Political economy JEL Classification O11 · J13 . . .in the traditional caste system groups in the population were condemned for life, and their descendants in perpetuity after them, to such task as the cleaning of latrines and the removal of dead carcasses... Apart from slavery, it is hard to think of a system with greater inequality of opportunity, and the results are also most unequal.
-Mancur Olson (1982: 156)
Introduction
When markets function perfectly inequality reflects differences in innate ability to acquire skills, to invest in capital, and/or to manage a labor force. This type of inequality is efficient. In this case, wealth, social status, caste, and/or family connections would not affect individual outcomes. However, as argued by Banerjee (2006) Galor and Zeira (1993) formalized well this idea. Their theory emphasizes the role of credit market imperfections and non-convexity in human capital investment in the persistence of income inequality. 2 Recent empirical evidence (see Easterly 2007) has shown that "inequality does cause underdevelopment." In the model presented in Galor and Zeira (1993) it is straightforward to design a policy to reduce inequality that is Pareto improving and that would also increase per capita income. 3 Contrary to the traditional efficiency-equity trade-off, such policies might increase efficiency and improve income distribution. Therefore, a complementary and important question is: why do not the countries adopt policies to improve the functioning of their credit market and/or their educational system? 1 There is no equality of opportunities when wealth and social status affect outcomes.
2 See Ray (2006) for a recent reference on this topic.
3 Government could issue bonds to finance education. The skilled descendants of unskilled parents would pay the debt. This policy is Pareto improving as long as the tax paid by skilled agents of unskilled descendants is not higher than the difference between the skilled and unskilled wage. Alternatively, multilateral agencies might provide financial aid to developing countries to improve their public education systems to institute free, compulsory education system or to improve the functioning of the credit market.
